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Abstract
In 1803, the Louisiana Purchase doubled the territory of the fledgling United States.
Taking control of and defending the new territory, especially the culturally heterogeneous city of
New Orleans occupied much of the administration’s time. Most of the burden for establishing the
defense policy rested on William C. C. Claiborne, a staunch Jeffersonian, former member of
Congress from Tennessee, and previous governor of the Mississippi Territory. By working with
local business leaders with a stake in American success, observing the local customs and
traditions, and gradually encouraging political participation, Claiborne successfully introduced
the American militia system to a culture far different from that of his native Virginia. Claiborne’s
policies reduced the likelihood that local dissidents and foreign powers such as Spain and Great
Britain could conspire to subvert American government in Louisiana by rebellion and invasion.

William C. C. Claiborne
Orleans Territory
Louisiana Purchase
Militia

v

Introduction
In December of 1803, William C. C. Claiborne, cousin of President Thomas Jefferson
and soon-to-be governor of the Orleans Territory, faced a situation like no United States
government official before him. Jefferson assigned Claiborne to administer an area almost the
size of the rest of the United States combined and encompassing a major urban area populated by
only a handful of residents that spoke English. Of the roughly 8,000 French-speaking residents
of the city of New Orleans, 3,500 were white, 3,100 were slaves, and 1,500 were free people of
color.1 The racial, linguistic, and cultural challenges to successful administration faced by
Claiborne, surpassed anything in American history to that point. Claiborne’s actions in
organizing the population into an effective militia force that would be loyal to the United States
were critical to the successful retention of the Louisiana Purchase, given the threat of foreign
intrigue against the territory, the possibility for local insurrection among the various ethnic
groups, and the Jefferson administration’s attitudes towards large standing armies.
Founded as private religious and entrepreneurial enterprises, Great Britain’s North
American colonies received little organized military aid from their parent nation. Even during the
imperial wars after 1688, Parliament’s reluctance to station large military formations in North
America meant that citizen-soldiers were responsible for the defense of the colonies.2 For local
defense against raiders, the system worked. In the event of attack, citizens took up arms to
defend their own properties. With this more than century-old tradition of self-defense, it is

1. Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization, ed. Arnold R. Hirsch and Joseph
Logsdon, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 208.
2. Stephen Saunders Webb, The Governor’s-General: The English Army and the
Definition of Empire, 1569-1681, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979);
Lindsay Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638, (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1967);
Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire; A Military History of the British Colonies in North
America, 1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan, 1973).
1

perhaps not surprising that when the colonial inhabitants rebelled against Britain they continued
to idolize the citizen-soldier.
The subsequent eight years (1775-1783) of war showed all of the flaws and advantages of
the militia. While future Federalists, such as Alexander Hamilton and George Washington,
witnessed the weaknesses of the militia first hand, including its limited offensive capability and
the troops’ frequently poor discipline; soon-to-be Democratic-Republicans such as Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison were not as easily put off. To the Jeffersonians, the weaknesses of
the militia system contained its greatest strengths. Its limitations required the government to
consider carefully its resort to military force in terms of lives and cost as well as political
support.3
After the American Revolution, Congress debated at length on how to organize the
military forces of the United States and incidents like the Newburgh “Conspiracy” and Shay’s
Rebellion provided ammunition to both sides of the argument. The constitutional convention
further exacerbated the debate. Federalists wanted a strong national army, while RepublicanDemocrats desired organized state militias of citizen-soldiers. The politicians eventually reached
a compromise that left potential military power in state hands. The Constitution (as amended)
provided for both a “well organized militia” in the Second Amendment and for the possibility of
a regular, national army in Article One, Section Eight. Congress laid out the standards for the
militia in a subsequent Militia Act of 1792. In Section One of the May 8 Act, Congress required
that all free able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 18 to 45 provide themselves with a

3. Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the American
Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802, (New York: Free Press, 1975); Lois G.
Schwoerer. No Standing Armies: The Anti-Army Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974);
2

musket or rifle, ammunition, and knapsack in preparation for musters and emergencies.4 The act
left to the states the power to dictate the frequency of musters and the enforcement of these
federally mandated standards. It also limited the time that state troops could be called into
service to a period of ninety days each year.
This compromise existed only in writing for the first years of the new Federal
Constitution. With Federalist control of the executive branch, Washington and John Adams did
little to promote militia service, which they saw as wasteful of both time and money and as a
state responsibility. Few citizens bothered to equip themselves as required by law and instead
paid the fines for not training. As a result, few state and local governments removed from the
frontier bothered to keep their militias organized. The lack of federal inspections and standards
enforcement only further hampered militia organization east of the Appalachians. Only on the
frontier did the militia system work, since the Native Americans did not sign the Treaty of Paris
battles in the Northwest Territory continued, and an organized militia was critical to the safety of
white settlers. Therefore, in the more dangerous border regions west of the mountains, the
militia system and Jeffersonian faith in the innate ability of citizen-soldiers flourished in
Kentucky and Tennessee.
Following war scares with both England and France, domestic protest in the form of the
Whiskey Rebellion, and an all-out war with the tribal federation of the Northwest Territory,
Washington and Adams slowly built up the U.S. Army and established the U.S. Navy.
Jefferson’s election in 1800, however, set the stage for a dramatic reversal of policy. The
Louisiana Purchase provided Jeffersonians, including the President’s cousin William C. C.

4. Militia Act of 1792, http://www.constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm [accessed
January 26, 2009].
3

Claiborne, an enormous laboratory with which to prove their theories on the reliability of militia
forces.
Jefferson negotiated the Louisiana Purchase in response to western pressure to acquire
the city of New Orleans. The city controlled access to the entire Mississippi watershed and thus
influenced the livelihood of the rural, cash crop growing Americans who inhabited the region.
Signed in 1795, the Pinckney Treaty with Spain had guaranteed the American “right of deposit”
at New Orleans. By the terms of the treaty, Americans could dock their riverboats at New
Orleans in order to transfer cargo to ocean-going vessels. In 1798, however, deteriorating
relations with the Spanish crown led to the revocation of the American right of deposit at the port
city. Following congressional pressure from Kentucky and Tennessee, and even threats of
secession, Jefferson began to seek a peaceful way of acquiring the mouth of the river.
The Spaniards wanted to maintain Louisiana as a buffer to keep the Americans away
from the silver mines in New Spain and did not want to see the colony fall into American hands.
In 1800, this policy ran into trouble when Napoleon Bonaparte secretly offered Spain a number
of European holdings in exchange for the colony. The soon-to-be Emperor wanted to restore
France as a colonial power and saw Louisiana as a vast tract of farmland to support France’s
sugar islands in the Caribbean. Spain accepted Napoleon’s offer, but almost immediately, the
First Consul of France ran into problems taking possession of Louisiana.
A slave uprising on Saint-Domingue consumed the efforts of all of France’s colonial
troops, so Bonaparte never had soldiers to spare to send to New Orleans. With French prospects
of success looking bleaker everyday and the secret of the sale of Louisiana ever harder to keep,
Bonaparte began to consider giving up Louisiana. The 1800 Treaty of San Ildefonso stated that
France would give Spain first chance of resuming, or in this case maintaining control, of

4

Louisiana. If Napoleon sold the colony to the Americans, he would be able to make some muchneeded money in the process however precarious the legality.5
In 1803, with demands from the western states increasing, Jefferson dispatched
emissaries to France to purchase the city of New Orleans. By this point, it was commonly
known that France “owned” Louisiana, though Spain still occupied the colony. To the American
delegation’s surprise, Napoleon not only agreed to the sale of New Orleans, but the whole colony
of Louisiana for only $15 million. The delegation signed the purchase agreement, and Jefferson
pushed the treaty through Congress. In one moment, the territorial limits of the United States
doubled. Taking possession of Louisiana entailed far greater risks for the young republic than
purchasing the new land. Spain and England both objected to the transfer of Louisiana, stating
that it violated the terms of the Treaty of San Ildefonso. If the United States intended to
guarantee the transfer of the new territory, it needed to take physical possession quickly before
European governments could contest the physical acquisition.
Even in April of 1803, when American emissaries signed the Louisiana Purchase,
Spanish soldiers still manned the parapets of the forts surrounding New Orleans, and the redbarred bandera of Aragon flew in the city’s main square, then called the Plaza des Armas. The
situation remained no different even in October, when American soldiers and civilian delegates
assembled at Fort Adams, near the town of Natchez in the Mississippi Territory. The French
Prefect Pierre-Clement de Laussat, expecting French soldiers who never came, still needed to
take control of Louisiana so the French government could transfer it to the United States. With
Spain officially protesting the Louisiana Purchase and the deadline for transfer to American
sovereignty growing near, Laussat had to take action soon. To assert French authority, he hastily
5

John Kukla, A Wilderness so Immense: The Louisiana Purchse and the Destiny of America,
(New York: Random House Press, 2003).
5

assembled a paltry militia force of French nationals residing in the New Orleans area, a number
of Americans, and local French Creoles with business connections to the previous two groups.
With this force, Laussat assumed political control of lower Louisiana on November 30, 1803 and
transferred it twenty days later to the American governor of the Mississippi Territory, William C.
C. Claiborne, the United States’ civilian representative, and Brigadier General James Wilkinson,
commanding general of the U.S. Army and secret part-time Spanish agent.
The United States could not take Spain’s protest of the Louisiana Purchase lightly as
Spain controlled all of the territory surrounding the southern portion of the Louisiana Purchase.
Little help could be expected from Wilkinson and the U.S. Army, so recently caught in the throes
of Jefferson’s reduction of that force. As a result, Claiborne needed to establish a dependable
militia at once in order to protect the new American territory.
Few historians have explored the issue of American defense policy toward the Louisiana
Purchase. Joseph Hatfield’s biography, William Claiborne: Jeffersonian Centurion in the
American Southwest (1976), explores Claiborne’s governorship but treats only slightly the issue
of the militia. Marietta Marie LeBreton’s unpublished Louisiana State University dissertation,
“A History of the Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812” (1969) also deals only with the issue of the
militia slightly as it is a general survey of the territory. Powell Casey’s work on the military
history of the period, Louisiana in the War of 1812 (1963), explores only the wartime period.
For social histories of the period and the impact of “Americanization” on the Creole
communities, both black and white, Joseph Tregle’s Louisiana in the Age of Jackson (1999) is
useful though it deals primarily with the later antebellum period. In addition, Creole New
Orleans: Race and Americanization (1992) edited by Arnold Hirsh and Joseph Logsdon is also a
standard work in the field and discusses the Americanization of the New Orleans population, but

6

does not examine the impact of the various militia organizations throughout the period and their
effects on the process “Americanization”. Caryn Cosse Bell examines the New Orleans free
people of color’s reaction to American control in her work Revolution, Romanticism, and the
Afro-Creole Protest Tradition, 1718-1868 (1997), but does not take into account the military
organization of the territory. Donald Everett in his Journal of Negro History article “Emigres
and Militiamen: Free Persons of Color in New Orleans, 1803-1815” (1953) moves back and
forth almost interchangeably between the militiamen that resided in the territory prior to the
Purchase and those that arrived as refugees from Saint-Domingue. The result is a limited
examination of the military policies of the United States in Louisiana during the initial period of
American rule. Roland McConnell’s Negro Troops of Antebellum New Orleans (1968) offers the
most comprehensive examination of the free men of color militia units throughout Louisiana’s
history. Paul Gelpi’s Louisiana History article, “Mr. Jefferson’s Creoles: The Battalion
d’Orleans and the Americanization of Creole Louisiana, 1803-1815,” (2007) explores the role of
the Orleans Volunteer Battalion and the reasons for Claiborne’s favoritism toward that unit.
Muster rolls from the Orleans Volunteer’s time in federal service in 1807, however, show that
the unit was predominantly Anglo-American in makeup and thus requires a reexamination of
Gelpi’s thesis. No work has looked at the policies of Claiborne’s early administration by
examining how they affected territorial civil and military relations. This paper will explore the
era before the southern portion of Louisiana became a federal territory. It was in this period,
before the establishment of the territorial government, that the foundations would be laid for the
militia policy of the Orleans Territory and the future antebellum State of Louisiana.
William Claiborne’s skill in implementing American practices of government and militia
service in the new territory assured retention of the Louisiana Purchase. By altering only those
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local conditions that needed immediate reform, Claiborne allowed the transition to American
administration to occur on a gradual basis that did not provoke a reaction against the new
government that other, more abrasive methods might have incited. These actions were critical in
the area of military defense because of the potential for local revolt and foreign intervention.
Through militia reform, Claiborne preempted a “fifth column” in Louisiana.

8

Chapter One: Arriving on the New Frontier
The military situation Claiborne faced upon taking possession of Louisiana was tenuous
at best. Claiborne possessed few regular troops for internal policing; Spanish soldiers still
walked the streets of New Orleans waiting for transport; and the governor’s intelligence on local
affairs was deplorable. Claiborne himself wrote: “Being a stranger in the country, I of course
stand in need of much local information as I proceed; and the suspicions which I have too much
reason to apprehend from latent interests in almost every quarter to which I can look, have often
induced me to deliberate longer than is consistent with the promptitude expected from me.”6 An
organized militia in New Orleans could provide a partial solution to these problems and help
maintain American control of the new territory.
When William C. C. Claiborne and Brigadier General James Wilkinson arrived in New
Orleans in December of 1803, they had only around five hundred soldiers with which to take
possession of all of lower Louisiana. This force was not impressive, especially since just under
half of this meager force consisted of militiamen from Natchez.7 The Militia Act of 1792 limited
the militia to only ninety days of federal service, so Claiborne and Wilkinson could keep the
Mississippi militia in service longer only if a uprising actually broke out in Louisiana.8
Releasing the militia before real control of the territory could be achieved increased the risk of
local civil disorder. What regular soldiers Claiborne and Wilkinson had at their disposal needed
to fan out across lower Louisiana. President Jefferson decided that the Army would be
responsible for taking possession of the coastal defense forts at the mouth of the Mississippi and
6. Claiborne to Madison, December 27, 1803, Ibid., 1:312.
7. Claiborne to Madison, December 7,1803, in Official Letter Books of W. C.C.
Claiborne, ed. Dunbar Rowland, (Jackson: Mississippi State Department of Archives and
History, 1917), 1:305.
8. Militia Act of 1792, http://www.constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm [accessed
January 26, 2009].
9

the rural portions of the territory. Army officers would act in a civil capacity as local
commandants under the direction of Claiborne.9 The 2nd U.S. Infantry regiment thus broke up
into company size formations and spread out into isolated garrisons far removed from New
Orleans. By January 3, Wilkinson’s morning return listed only fifty-nine regular army soldiers
remaining on duty within the city out of the roughly three hundred that had marched down from
Natchez in December.10 With hundreds of Spanish soldiers still present in the city of New
Orleans and almost no force to back up American authority, Claiborne’s speedy establishment of
the New Orleans militia was of paramount importance. Claiborne’s very first letter to Secretary
of State James Madison after taking possession of Louisiana addressed the issue of the militia.
Claiborne revealed his greatest handicap: a lack of knowledge of local personalities and former
policy. “I am induced to await a further acquaintance with the nature of the present
establishment, before I attempt any organization of the force.”11
The lack of information on military conditions in Spanish New Orleans for Claiborne,
and indeed the whole American government, was largely the fault of Daniel Clark. Clark was
the unofficial American consul in New Orleans between 1801 and 1803. When Jefferson asked
Clark to report on the organization and strength of the Spanish forces in the city, Clark provided
Jefferson with the militia returns from the period of Spanish Governor Francisco Luis Hector de
Carondelet, who served from 1791-1797.12 Carondelet gave the militia considerable attention
during his time as governor. However, none of the three governors who succeeded Carondelet in

9. Bowmar to Claiborne, April 15,1804, in The Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812, vol. 9 of
Territorial Papers of the United States, ed. Clarence Edwin Carter, (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1940), 223; Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, January 3, 1804,
Ibid., 9:149.
10. Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, January 3,1804, Ibid., 152.
11. Claiborne to Madison, December 20, 1803, Letter Books, 1:306.
12. Clark to Madison, Sep 8, 1803, The Territory of Orleans, 33.
10

the next six years showed the same interest in the militia, and they allowed the organization to
fall into a state of limited usefulness. As a result, the returns from Carondelet’s time were hardly
representative of the conditions that existed in 1803. Why Clark would have gotten this matter
so wrong is puzzling, given his attention to detail elsewhere. It is possible that the Spanish
themselves misinformed Clark, or that the musters from Carondelet’s tenure were the only
reports available. However, Clark may have had more personal reasons for filing a misleading
report. A native of County Sligo, Ireland, Clark moved to New Orleans in 1786 from
Philadelphia and bought land near Natchez.13 Clark was well versed in the personalities of the
area and fluent in English, French, and Spanish. In a characterization of New Orleans residents
compiled for Jefferson by Wilkinson, the report stated that Clark “possesses capacities to do
more good or harm than any other individual in the province – He pants for power, and is
mortified by disappointment.”14 As American consul at the time of the Purchase, Claiborne
depended on Clark for his knowledge of the language and local personalities. Unbeknownst to
Claiborne, Clark believed that he should have carried more influence during the transfer of the
colony and its territorial government. Clark wrote to a friend: “Were they asleep when they
appointed that creature, Claiborne, to degrade the American government in the eyes of the
inhabitants of Louisiana?”15 As Claiborne’s most ardent political opponent, Clark may have
made the acquisition of Louisiana appear more difficult than expected and then perhaps Jefferson
would replace Claiborne with someone of proper talents, like Clark, for the top leadership role.

13. Thomas Abernethy, The Burr Conspiracy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1954), 18; George Dargo, Jefferson’s Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 31-32.
14. Characterization of New Orleans Residents, July 1,1804, The Territory of Orleans,
255.
15. Richmond Enquirer, February 23, 1808
11

The American administration’s fear of the Spanish militia was not entirely justified and
resulted from limited understanding of the Spanish militia system and from the poor information
Claiborne received prior to his arrival. Composed of New Orleans Creoles, rural Cajuns, and
free men of color, the militia of Spanish Louisiana had been a proud institution. Well-drilled and
organized by Spanish Governor Bernardo de Galvez, the militia participated in the American
Revolution when it fought in Galvez’s lightning attack on British controlled Baton Rouge.
Portions of the Louisiana militia also participated in Galvez’s subsequent successful attacks on
Mobile and Pensacola. Indeed, the militia of Spanish Louisiana played a significant role in
destroying British power along the Gulf Coast. However, by 1803 the victories under Galvez
were a distant memory for Louisiana’s militia. With Britain’s threat reduced, American
settlements still hundreds of miles away, and the lakes north of New Orleans protecting the city
from Indian attacks, the militia saw little reason to train. The organization as a whole fell into
apathy, and governors began to dispense officer’s commissions largely as political favors
connected with a government stipend, a flashy uniform, and a title. About the only group to
avoid the malaise of neglect were the two free men of color companies in New Orleans.16
It did not take Claiborne long to realize the defects in the Spanish militia system. He
wrote Madison: “I have found several young men holding rank above their years, and some
others who are unpopular as officers and under whom the militia will serve very reluctantly if at

16. Jack D. L. Holmes, Honor and Fidelity: the Louisiana Infantry Regiment and the
Louisiana Militia Companies, 1766-1821 (Birmingham, Ala.: The Author, 1965); Roland
McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana: A History of the Battalion of free men of
color, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968); Caryn Cossé Bell, Revolution,
Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana, 1718-1868 (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State University Press, 1997).
12

all.”17 In the same letter, Claiborne also wrote to his superiors in Washington concerning an
issue that would plague him throughout his years as commander-in-chief of the militia.
My principle difficulty arises from two large companies of people of
color, who are attached to the service, and were esteemed a very serviceable corps
under the Spanish government. On this particular corps I have reflected with
much anxiety. To re-commission them might be considered an outrage on the
feelings of a part of the nation, and as opposed to those principles of policy which
the safety of the southern states has necessarily established; on the other hand not
to be re-commissioned, would disgust them, and might be productive of future
mischief. To disband them would be to raise an armed enemy in the very heart of
the country, and to disarm them would savor to strongly that desperate system of
government which seldom succeeds.18
Realizing that any decision would be highly controversial and possibly set a precedent for
similar situations in other territories, Claiborne decided to let his superiors decide how to
handle the free men of color. He ended his letter to Madison by informing him: “I shall
await some opinions and instructions from the Department of State, and have therefore to
beg, that I be favoured with them as soon as possible.”19
Waiting for word from Washington on how to handle the militia system, however,
was not realistic. In the years before the construction of the Natchez Trace, a one-way
overland trip from New Orleans to Washington, D.C. took about four weeks. The
Mississippi militiamen who had accompanied Claiborne downriver were ready to go
home, and their continued service almost doubled the cost of American military
personnel in the region. free men of color and possible Spanish sympathizers aside,
Claiborne needed to find a local solution to his militia problem and fast.
The good news for the beleaguered governor was that his immediate predecessor,
French Prefect Pierre Laussat, had been in a similar situation and had already arrived at a
17. Claiborne to Madison, December 27, 1804, Letter Books, 1:313-314.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
13

temporary solution. Laussat came to New Orleans in 1803 with only a handful of
military officers and the promise of more troops to follow. Because of French military
commitments to Europe and Saint-Domingue, Laussat’s soldiers never arrived. Though
Laussat’s mission became one of transfer and not governance, he had to take actual
possession of New Orleans so that he could pass it on to the United States. Laussat, like
Claiborne, feared that the Spanish might try to block the Purchase by force. Laussat
raised a volunteer company of French expatriates, enlisting them in the French army only
so long as it would take to hand over the city.20 To add strength to this force, Daniel
Clark and a number of others offered to recruit a company of recent American
immigrants and their Creole business partners, an emergency force that amounted to
some three hundred men.21 Because the Spanish had organized the free men of color
companies, Laussat did not accept their services. Following the transfer, the French
company soon disbanded, but the predominantly Anglo-American company reorganized
into four smaller companies in order to volunteer as a battalion in Claiborne’s service.22
The predominantly Anglo-American companies were not the only citizens desirous of
service in the militia however. On January 16, the officers of the free men of color companies
came to make an appeal to Claiborne, asking him to maintain the status of their volunteer
companies:

20. Pierre-Clement de Laussat, Memoirs of my life to my son during the years 1803 and
after, which I spent in public service in Louisiana as Commissioner of the French government
for the retrocession to France of that colony and for its transfer to the United States (Baton
Rouge: Published for the Historic New Orleans Collection by the Louisiana State University
Press, 1978), 74.
21. “Dispatches From the U.S. Consulate in New Orleans, 1801-1803, II,” American
Historical Review 33, no. 2. (1928): 356 n.43.
22. Claiborne to Madison, January 2,1804, Letter Books, 1:325.
14

We were employed in the military service of the late government, and we hope
we may be permitted to say, that our conduct in that service has ever been
distinguished by a ready attention to the duties required of us. Should we be in
like manner be employed by the American government, to which every principle
of interest as well as affection attaches us, permit us to assure your Excellency
that we shall serve with fidelity and zeal. We therefore respectfully offer our
services to the government as a corps of volunteers agreeable to any arrangement
which may be thought expedient.23
Claiborne informed them “that under the protection of the United States, their liberty, property
and religion were safe, and their confidence in the justice and liberality of the American
government would increase as they became acquainted with its principles and the wisdom and
virtue with which it was administered.”24 However, “…[Claiborne] should not attempt a general
re-organization of the militia, until [he] had received particular instructions from the President;
that in the mean time, they would remain in the same position in which the former governor had
placed them.”25 He concluded by offering them “assurances of my confidence in their military
zeal, and in their sincerity of the professions of attachment to the United States.”26 Claiborne
thus, allowed the companies of free men of color to continue.
In need of still more troops though, the following day Claiborne decided to enroll the
reorganized volunteer companies and notified Madison that he had “organized in this city, four
companies of volunteer militia; they are armed with public muskets, appear to possess an ardent
military spirit and sincere attachment to the United States.”27For Claiborne, these volunteer
companies solved his most pressing needs. Composed of Americans already residing in the city
and Creoles of proven loyalty from the business community, the unit would have a stake in the
stability of the new American government. Further, the bicultural nature of the unit would
23. Address From the free people of color, January 1804, Territory of Orleans, 174.
24. Claiborne to Madison, January 17, 1804, Letter Books, 1:339-340.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Claiborne to Madison, January 17, 1804, Ibid., 339-340.
15

provide linguistic capabilities that the Anglo-American militiamen from Mississippi and
Claiborne himself lacked. Finally, using these companies would presumably be a political
success, as it would allow the French Creoles to serve in the military force of the city and help
legitimize the new American government rather than making it appear as an occupying power
depending on foreign troops.
By accepting the service of the Orleans Volunteers and placating the two companies of
free men of color, Claiborne managed to buy time until he could receive official directions from
Washington on how to handle the military, cultural, and racial problems facing him. It is curious
that Claiborne received so little direction on how to handle taking possession of Louisiana as a
whole and New Orleans in particular. This lack of direction possibly resulted from the
inexperience of the Democratic administration to anticipate the problems associated with taking
control of the new land. Indeed, even the precedents set in the Northwest Territory and
Mississippi Territory were largely inapplicable. In both cases, as in Kentucky and Tennessee,
the United States had moved into a sparsely populated region. The predominantly French
settlements that did exist before annexation quickly succumbed to the massive influx of AngloAmericans. The United States government treated the larger Native American populations as
protectorates and kept them separate from white settlements. In contrast, in Louisiana, the
United States took possession of a large, concentrated population that, though free and not
Native American, was not Anglo and not even all white. The acquisition of Louisiana was
without precedent in United States history. The Jefferson administration seems to have been
unprepared for the situations with which its representatives might have to deal. This time the
United States inherited a large, diverse urban population, not a rural one of Anglo-American
pioneers.
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It is possible that Madison sent Claiborne without instructions so that the situation could
be assessed before deciding on a course of action. At the time, many Anglo-American arrivals in
the city believed that the area should immediately become a state. Along with Daniel Clark,
Edward Livingston (brother to the signer of the Louisiana Purchase) drew up a memorial to
Congress demanding just such an action.28 These Americans sought to become leaders in local
politics by convincing the Creoles that the Americans possessed a greater grasp of American
laws and “rights” than the Creoles. Livingston and Clark’s calls for immediate statehood stood
no chance, however. One of the biggest issues standing in the way of statehood was that the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 stipulated that Congress would admit a state into the union only
when a territory reached a population of 60,000 people, not including slaves.29 To even come
close to this figure, the whole of Louisiana needed to be included. Doing so would create a
single state almost the same territorial size as the rest of the nation combined. As a result,
Congress ignored Livingston and Clark’s memorial for statehood. Some, like General
Wilkinson, advocated martial law in the territory until the Creoles could be integrated as a
political group.30 Others, including Claiborne, felt that immediate but gradual representation was
the best course. James Workman, longtime resident of the city and future Judge of Orleans
County, summarized the challenge:
In a country like [the Territory of Orleans], just emerging from despotism,
composed of the inhabitants of various nations and languages, unacquainted with
political concerns, because they had not before been allowed to take any share in
the administration of government; it may perhaps be good policy to regulate [its]

28. Claiborne to Madison, June 3, 1804, Territory of Orleans, 242; Claiborne to Jefferson
July 1, 1804, Ibid., 246-247.
29. Northwest Ordinance, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp [accessed
January 26, 2009].
30. Claiborne to Madison, June 29, 1804, Territory of Orleans, 245.
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admission as an independent member of the great American union, by gradual and
progressive steps.31
While debates on the intricacies of republican government continued, Claiborne needed
to deal with the problems of cultural harmony on a daily basis. Luckily for the governor, the
situation in New Orleans remained relatively peaceful. The only flurry of violence occurred in a
rather odd place over an even odder issue. On the night of January 24, the city ballroom held a
dance commemorating the transfer of sovereignty, and all of the principal officials attended the
soirée. Among the Americans were Wilkinson, Claiborne, and Clark, the latter acting as the
governor’s personal translator. In addition, both former French and Spanish administrators
attended the ball. The night began peaceably as Claiborne ordered two French quadrilles played
for every English quadrille. A number of heavy-footed dancers, however, threw the schedule
off, and a dispute began over what type of dance to play next. The argument degenerated as the
Americans tried to assert that an English dance be played since General Wilkinson wanted to be
one of the dancers. Claiborne tried to intervene with Clark translating for him. Given Clark’s
animosity for Claiborne even at this early stage, Claiborne’s appeals may not have been correctly
presented to the French Creoles. A brawl soon erupted, and the American regular soldiers, who
happened to be on duty for patrols that night, stormed in and broke up the scuffle. Once the
soldiers got the situation under control, Claiborne ordered a French dance played. The
Americans in the room slunk to one corner of the hall and, led by Wilkinson, began to sing “Hail
Columbia” and “God Save the King.” Led by the former Prefect Laussat, the French Creoles
returned in kind with “le Marseilles.” Spanish officials stood by, watching and laughing.

31. Historical Militia Data on the Conspiracy of Aaron Burr, ed. James Parton, (New
Orleans: Jackson Barracks, 1939), 3:80.
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Claiborne, beleaguered, must have felt like returning to Mississippi and giving up civil service.32
A few days later, Claiborne, after discussions with the mayor of New Orleans, issued a general
order detailing a militia officer and fifteen militiamen to the city ballroom as added security for
public gatherings.33
Eager for military service of a sort and with still no word from Washington, a number of
Creoles began to join the Orleans Volunteers. So as not to overwhelm the fledgling officers of
the new companies or allow the entry of possible Spanish sympathizers into the volunteer militia,
Claiborne restricted enlistments into the unit. On February 2, Colonel Joseph Bellechasse,
Claiborne’s head of the militia, ordered that:
The noncommissioned officers and privates, of the original corps of militia within
Louisiana, who have attached themselves to the volunteer companies in the city of
New Orleans, are transferred to these companies respectively and will do service
accordingly. But in the future the officers commanding volunteer companies are
not to enroll any noncommissioned officer, or private belonging to the original
corps34
While some citizens tried to get into the militia, Bellechasse asked Claiborne to let him
out. When Laussat gained control of the colony, he had appointed the Louisiana native head of
the militia. Claiborne retained Bellechasse in this position despite the latter’s twenty-four years
of service in the local Spanish forces. Bellechasse left Spanish service on bad terms over a
dispute about his pension. As a result, there was little love lost between Bellechase and the head
of the Spanish government in New Orleans, the Marques de Casa Calvo.35 Unfortunately for
Claiborne, Bellechasse owed a great deal of money to Clark and did not want to anger his
32. Laussat, 95-96; New Orleans Le Telegraphe et la Commercial Advertiser, February 1,
1804; New Orleans Louisiana Gazette, January 25, 1805.
33. Claiborne to Bore, January 28, 1804, Letter Books, 1:351; General Order, January 28,
1804, Ibid., 352.
34. General Order, February 2, 1804, Ibid., 358.
35. William Bradley ed., Interim Appointment: W.C.C. Claiborne Letter Book, 18041805, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 273.
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creditor. By March 1804, the relationship between Clark and Claiborne had deteriorated to the
point where Bellechasse and others were trying to escape being drawn into their political feud.
Clark spoke out against Claiborne on a number of occasions concerning the governor’s supposed
inaction in organizing the militia, to which Claiborne could only retort that he awaited
instructions from Washington. The whole affair made Claiborne look indecisive and weak. In
March, Bellechasse wrote Claiborne notifying the governor of his desire to be relieved as the
head of the militia, citing Bellechasse’s inability to command Anglo-American troops in the
English language. Claiborne responded four days later, informing the colonel that he needed
Bellechasse in command because the locals trusted Bellechasse, and he spoke their language.36
Claiborne’s inability to speak French limited almost every effort he made to understand
or explain himself to the people he now governed, but Jefferson picked Claiborne not for his
linguistic skills but for the character of his beliefs. Though Claiborne was the cousin of Thomas
Jefferson, and two other people had turned down the job, Claiborne’s appointment was not
purely desperate nepotism. Claiborne’s record as a Tennessee congressman showed a strong
belief in Jeffersonian politics, and he had gained administrative experience as governor of the
Mississippi Territory. To his death he remained an ardent believer in Jeffersonian democracy,
and more than likely Jefferson appointed the sometimes-awkward Claiborne as governor for his
talents, not kinship. Jefferson could trust Claiborne to try his best to teach America’s newest
citizens about American democracy and not to use them as tools of political advancement as
Clark and his associates continued to do. Further, whoever directly ruled New Orleans had
considerable influence in the politics of the western United States. Claiborne took no dramatic
steps upon taking control of New Orleans and continually wrote to Washington for advice and

36. Claiborne to Bellechasse, March 17, 1804, Letter Books, 2:49-50.
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instruction, and as such the authority of governing Louisiana remained ultimately with the
President of the United States, as Jefferson intended.
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Chapter Two: Sorting Out Friends and Enemies
If Claiborne intended to retain possession of Louisiana, he needed to get the militia
organized and loyal to the United States in case of foreign interference or internal dissent. Now
that theJefferson administration had a clearer idea of the situation in Louisiana, it could provide
Claiborne with some direction, and the governor could begin to plan and implement his policies.
After considering the options, Claiborne and the Jefferson administration made a number
of decisions concerning the retention of the Louisiana Purchase and its territorial defense. On
February 20, 1804, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn wrote Claiborne from Washington
informing the governor of the decisions. Concerning the issue of the free men of color retaining
their volunteer companies, “it has been ultimately decided, that under the existing circumstances
it will be expedient either to continue or renew the organization, as may in your Excellency’s
opinion be most proper.”37 Dearborn qualified this prudent concession later in the letter by
telling Claiborne “not to increase the Corps, but diminish, if it can be done without giving
offense; the principal officers should be selected with caution, having regard to the respectability
and integrity of character, as well as their popular influence among their associates.”38 In
closing, the secretary then probably surprised Claiborne: “It may be advisable to present them
with a standard or flag as a token of confidence placed in them by the government; it need not be
large or very expensive, but such as will be satisfactory to the corps.”39 Which member of the
administration proposed a standard for the free men of color companies is not clear, but the
decision is interesting as none of the white units in the city yet possessed a flag. Despite this,
providing the free men of color with a standard would demonstrate the administration’s belief in

37. Dearborn to Claiborne, February 20,1804, Ibid., 54-55.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
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the respectability of the unit. On the issues concerning the white volunteer companies and city
militia, Dearborn wrote that Claiborne’s actions met with the full approval of the president.
Jefferson cleared Claiborne to go ahead with the organization of the militia as Claiborne saw fit.
Now that Claiborne had instructions on how to proceed with the trickier aspects of the
militia, he could continue his organization of the force in earnest. Bellechasse, citing ill health,
declined to travel to New Orleans and Claiborne supplanted him with Eugene Dorsiere, whom he
commissioned as a major. Claiborne informed Dorsiere of his intention to bring the militia to
“effectual execution” as quickly as possible. 40 To organize the militia, the governor’s first tasks
were to establish regional boundaries for the individual units, conduct a census of the area to
determine who needed to serve, and appoint officers to carry out the actual organization.
Claiborne decided to handle the organization of the city militia personally because of the
particularly challenging political situation within the city. In the rural, frontier portions of the
territory, he trusted the U.S. Army officers whom he appointed as district commandants to
handle the task. As for frontier population centers such as Natchitoches and Attakapas,
Claiborne judged the local regular army officers best qualified to select militia officers and
organize the militia.41 His instructions to the district commanders contain the first signs of how
he planned to handle the organization of the provisional government’s militia in New Orleans. In
his circular to the commandants, he wrote: “you are authorized to take such measures to
[organize the militia] as your judgment many dictate, and as may be consistent with the former
regulations of the country.”42 Claiborne decided against attempting a complete immediate
overhaul of the Spanish militia. Instead, he chose to keep the system intact where possible, but

40. Claiborne to Dorsiere, March 30, 1804, Ibid., 71.
41. Claiborne to Bowmar, May 15, 1804, Ibid., 149.
42. Circular to Commandants of Districts, March 31, 1804, Ibid., 72.
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under new leadership. Claiborne retained the Spanish militia organization only as a stopgap until
he could assemble a territorial legislature that could write a permanent militia law.
The Spanish and Anglo-American militia did not vary much in organization. Free men
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five assembled once a month to receive training. In
mission, however, the Spanish and American militias differed. Under the United States, the
militia executed the primary security role and under Spain, it existed only as an auxiliary to the
standing army. By converting the Louisiana militia gradually, Claiborne saved himself some
political friction by not ousting Spanish appointed officers unnecessarily. He also gave
Louisianans time to adjust to the new conditions of militia service and its added importance
under the American system.
By April 19, 1804 Claiborne began to take care of the militia organization of New
Orleans itself. Writing to New Orleans Mayor Etienne Boré and the New Orleans municipal
council, he informed them: “Having determined upon an immediate reorganization of the Militia
of New Orleans, and it being necessary…to ascertain the number of persons capable of bearing
arms, I request your Council to cause to be taken a correct census of all the free white inhabitants
of this City between the ages of eighteen and forty five and to report the same to me.”43 Once a
census was taken, Claiborne and his staff would have a clear understanding of who militia
service applied to in the city and could begin the organization of the general militia in earnest.
President Jefferson’s instructions to Claiborne sometimes complicated the governor’s
efforts to organize the city militia as quickly as possible. Claiborne needed to handle very
carefully the incorporation of free men of color into the overall militia, lest the governor acquire
more enemies in the process. Claiborne wanted to appoint white officers to lead the free men of

43. Claiborne to Mayor and Municipality of New Orleans, April 19, 2004, Ibid., 106.
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color units, but company level officers of African descent were already in place. By
amalgamating the two companies into a battalion formation, Claiborne could justify putting a
white officer and staff in command without relieving any of the existing officers of their
positions. Accordingly, Claiborne “appointed two Majors to the Battalion of Free People of
Colour, and deemed it advisable to select gentlemen in whom I could place entire confidence.
Mr. Fortier, a native of Louisiana, a merchant in this city, and a man of great respectability, I
appointed Senior Major, and Mr. Lewis Kerr, who lived sometime in the Mississippi Territory,
and came to this city a member of my family (the Junior Major).”44 According to Claiborne, the
free men of color found the situation unsatisfactory, “desirous of being commanded by people of
their own color, and some dissatisfaction prevailed.” However, after speaking to them, Claiborne
could tell Secretary of State James Madison that “we had a long conference relative to the
battalion, and I have the pleasure to inform you that the Majors I have appointed were cordially
acknowledged, and every appearance of discontent removed.”45
With the free men of color battalion now organized, Claiborne had only to obtain the unit
flags that Dearborn had suggested. The Secretary of War, on behalf of the president, advised
Claiborne to present a standard to the free people of color in order to show them that their service
was valuable to the United States government. Claiborne, a Virginian, a former Tennessee
congressman, and lately, governor of the Mississippi territory, knew that presenting a standard to
free men of color came with complications. While Jefferson had sanctioned, at government
expense, the acquisition of a flag for the free men of color, he had not authorized Claiborne to
spend money on flags for the city militia regiment or the Orleans Volunteers. Claiborne knew he
needed to acquire these flags, lest he risk the public cry out against him for banner
44. Claiborne to Dearborn, June 9, 1804, Ibid., 199-120.
45. Ibid.
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discrimination. To solve the problem, Claiborne worked with General Wilkinson to obtain both
the regimental and national standards of the disbanded 4th U.S. Infantry Regiment for the white
units.46 Claiborne managed to have the old regiment’s names painted over with “Orleans
Volunteers” and “Orleans Militia.”47 The Orleans Volunteers received their standard during a
military review held on April 30, the anniversary of the signing of the Louisiana Purchase. As
Claiborne wrote to Jefferson directly, “I presented an elegant Standard to the Battalion of
Orleans Volunteers; it was received with much enthusiasm, and will, I am persuaded, have a
happy effect.”48
On June 21, 1804, the free people of color battalion received its flag: “a stand of
colours…of white silk, ornamented with fifteen stripes (alternately red and white.)”49 When the
battalion received its new standard, some citizens of New Orleans objected to the unit receiving
its flag before the white city militia and guards were placed around the parade ground.50
On the Fourth of July, the Orleans Militia finally received its standard. At the request of
Colonel Bellechasse, the militia held the ceremony in the St. Louis Cathedral opposite the city’s
main parade field once again called the Place des Armes, as it had been before Spanish rule.
Claiborne wrote Madison that he chose this location “in order that after the flag was presented it
might receive a benediction as is customary among Catholics… and the presentation in the
church and subsequent benediction has rendered the flag peculiarly dear to the Militia.”51
Claiborne showed good political and cultural acumen by allowing the proceedings to be held “to
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47. Claiborne to Madison, October 16, 1804, Ibid., 353-354.
48. Claiborne to Jefferson, May 3, 1804, Territory of Orleans, 240.
49. Claiborne to Dearborne, June 22, 1804, Letter Books, 2:218.
50. James Sterrett to Nathaniel Evans, June 23, 1804, Nathaniel Evans Papers, 1794-1807
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51. Claiborne to Madison, July 5, 1804, Letter Books, 2:236-237.
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conform to the religious customs of the people.”52 Also, by giving the city militia a larger public
reception than the Orleans Volunteers or the free people of color, Claiborne probably hoped to
dispel any grievances of the city militia about receiving their flag last.
Though the officers of the city militia participated in the flag ceremony, they still had not
received their commissions. On July 7, 1804, the appointment documents finally arrived from
Washington. Claiborne instructed Bellechasse: “to establish the grade of the officers according
to their former rank.” Claiborne tried to upset the existing system as little as possible and
retained the more competent militia officers who had served under Spain in their equivalent
ranks.
On July 12, 1804, with the officer corps now established, Claiborne was able to issue his
first general order to the New Orleans militia. He commanded all free white males of applicable
age to report to a place determined by their company officers so that non-commissioned officers
could be selected.53 Accordingly, within a week, the men assembled at locations around the city
and for the first time since the United States took over the government, the general militia of the
city of New Orleans and its surrounding suburbs fell in for service.
Claiborne chose to modify things as little as possible. After seven months of living in the
city, he had a good understanding of who could be trusted and capable of commanding the
militia of his largest population center. By altering only those elements that needed changing in
the existing system, Claiborne avoided political battles he might otherwise have had to fight and
gave the locals time to adapt to the new role of the militia.
Claiborne completed his organization of the militia just in time. Spain and the United
States had yet to agree upon the exact boundaries of Louisiana. The United States asserted that
52. Ibid.
53. General Order, July 12, 1804, Ibid., 2:242-243.
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the northern shore of Lake Pontchartrain was part of the Louisiana Purchase, a claim which
Spain ardently denied. While diplomats attempted to sort out the issue thousands of miles away,
some of the Anglo residents of West Florida, as the area was then known, decided to take matters
into their own hands. Lead by West Floridian resident Reuben Kemper, these insurgents raided
the Spanish garrison of Baton Rouge in West Florida. Spain insisted that the United States
government had supplied the insurgents and encouraged them to rebel against the Spanish
Crown. Local American officials denied this claim, and Claiborne ordered militia patrols in the
area to arrest anyone acting in a suspicious manner. Claiborne hoped the patrols might limit
support to the insurgents from United States territory.54 In response to Spanish claims that the
United States was aiding insurgents against the Crown, rumors of a Spanish-instigated slave
uprising began to circulate throughout south Louisiana. Credible or not, Claiborne could not
help but act on these types of rumors in the heart of Louisiana’s plantation country. The governor
ordered militia patrols reinforced to suppress any suppress any suspicious activity the patrols
found.55 When Jefferson learned of these events, he gave Claiborne full permission to stop
Kemper’s insurgents, if possible, so that relations with Spain would not further deteriorate.56 The
Kemper Rebellion proved to be only the first of many standoffs over the next decade with the
Spanish authorities in the area. The critical question in both Madrid and Washington always
remained: which side would the Louisianans chose if a shooting war did break out? As a result,
Claiborne’s actions in administering the militia of the lower portion of the Louisiana Purchase
continued to play a significant role in military and political confrontations along the Gulf Coast.
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Despite Claiborne’s efforts to avoid political discontent concerning the militia, a political
circular, later connected to associates of Daniel Clark, attacked the governor’s actions in
organizing the militia of New Orleans. The circular claimed that Claiborne not only favored the
Anglo-American newcomers by supporting the Orleans Volunteers, but he insulted all white
people by favoring the free men of color over the white city militia.57 The circular pointed out
that the free men of color battalion received their flag before the white city militia and that the
free men of color battalion’s flag was larger. This was the political context when Claiborne
wrote Madison to complain about his situation and assure the admistration that he could handle
the problem. He explained to Madison: “I do not believe that a single modern Louisianan
(except those of the volunteer corps) holds an appointment in the militia; and among the officers
of the volunteer corps, there are several ancient Louisianans, and one of them is the Major
commanding.”58 With respect to the Orleans Volunteers, he reminded Madison:
Previous to my arrival in New Orleans, the citizens of the United States, residing
in the city, associated for the purposes of assisting in the preservation of order,
had offered their services as a volunteer corps, to Mr. Laussat, and which he
readily accepted: when the flag of their country was unfurled, and Louisiana
declared part of the United States, their services, (as might be expected) were
again offered and that governor, who rejected the patriotic offer, would have acted
unworthily. – several companies were formed and, and I have understood that
some of the ancient militia were enrolled in the new corps: but the command of
the battalion, was given by me, to an ancient Louisianan. – Did this evidence an
improper partiality for native Americans?59
He continued: “In acknowledging the Battalion of free people of color and presenting them a
standard, I acted in conformity to the instructions from the Secretary of War, and the delay
attending the organization of the militia generally was the result of necessity.”60
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While the public criticism from Clark and his associates rattled Claiborne, the first
session of the new Territorial Legislature in December of 1804 showed approval of many of
Claiborne’s actions concerning the militia. When they met, the legislators approved all but one
of Claiborne’s measures on militia affairs. The legislature did not mention the free men of color
battalion at all, and as a result, the unit passed out of legal existence. Without legislative
approval, any assemblage of the free men of color under arms could be considered a threatening
act towards the government. Only Louisiana’s white men would serve in the militia for now.
Though, as James Brown, a Louisiana land agent wrote Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin
“the free people of color have lost their consequence by being stripped of arms [they] are anxious
to regain it,” the specter of another Saint-Domingue hovered in the thoughts of Louisiana’s
planter elite.61
The legislature not only approved Claiborne’s actions in recognizing the Orleans
Volunteers, but also, to the governor’s pleasure, provided for the establishment of more
volunteer companies. If a group of citizens desired to start a unit, and elect officers, members
needed only to organize and equip themselves at their own expense and drill more frequently
than the general militia. This system, already more effective across the country than the general
militia, proved even more popular in Louisiana. The nature of volunteer companies made them
more analogous to social aid and pleasure clubs than military units in some ways and morale
much higher as a result. The membership chose to serve together, drafted its own bylaws, and
restricted its membership. Even uniforms showed the power of local option since the members
61. Acts Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Council of the Territory of
Orleans: Begun and Held at the Principal, in the City of New-Orleans, on Monday the Third Day
of December, in the Year of Our Lord, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Four, and of the
Independence of the U. States the Twenty-Ninth, (New-Orleans: Printed by James M. Bradford,
printer to the territory, 1805), 26-28, 120, 262-300; James Brown to Albert Gallatin, January 9,
1807, Territory of Orleans, 559.
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chose to clothe themselves as they wanted, and sometimes the uniforms bore little resemblance
to the U.S. Army. Because of this independence, the members could choose to drill and
communicate with officers in languages other than English. The linguistic diversity of south
Louisiana made this company autonomy an especially attractive option for the area’s citizensoldiers.
Many of the features that made volunteer companies attractive to New Orleanians were
equally the traits that made service in the general militia undesirable. The selection of officers by
the government meant that no guarantee existed that the commanding officer could even have a
conversation with the militiamen under his authority. The situation was compounded by the
multitude of languages found in the city. Unlike the Pennsylvania Germans or the Irish of New
York, the territorial and subsequent state government of Louisiana dealt with city militia
regiments in New Orleans composed of not just one foreign language, but up to a half-dozen. In
northern cities, non-English speaking groups were a minority. Though English was now the
language of government, only a minority of the population spoke it in New Orleans during the
first decades of American rule. These linguistic and cultural differences handicapped the city
militia of New Orleans throughout the early national period.
As for Claiborne, he continued to defend his reputation and policies against Clark, and
fought the legislature throughout the territorial period to get the free people of color battalion put
back into the militia structure. Whether out of Jeffersonian idealism that free citizens should be
able to defend themselves, or a practical fear of alienating a significant portion of the population,
Claiborne clashed with the territorial assembly to see his principles realized. In 1812, when
Louisiana entered the union as the eighteenth state, not only did Claiborne win election as
governor, but he finally managed to get a provision authorizing the service of free people of

31

color once more. However, the Louisiana legislature did not sanction the actual organization of
the unit until the British invasion of Louisiana in 1814.62
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Chapter Three: Conclusion
William C. C. Claiborne laid the foundations of what would become the militia of the
State of Louisiana. In organizing the local the militia of Louisiana, Claiborne and the Jefferson
administration faced a number of problems with no precedent in the history of United States.
Before the Louisiana Purchase, the United States had only moved into sparsely populated areas
and as a result could quickly dominate any non-Anglo residents. In the case of Louisiana,
however, the United States encountered a large, heterogeneous population that it could not
quickly assimilate into mainstream Anglo-Protestant culture. Further complicating the matter,
Americans who already resided in Louisiana expected political positions, and proved hostile to
the government when they failed to gain them. As a result, Claiborne was required to deal with
not only educating the Louisianans on the American system of governance, but also protecting
them from those who would exploit them for political gain. All of these conflicts resulted in a
large and dramatic game of frontier politics, made only worse by the threat of international
conflict. If Claiborne could not navigate the host of problems facing him regarding the
organization of the militia, he risked opening Louisiana up to the very real threat of foreign
intrigue or local insurrection.
From the moment the United States and France signed the Louisiana Purchase, Spain
contested the sale of Louisiana. With Spanish lands almost encircling the disputed territory,
Spain could have attempted to solve the situation militarily. The rapid changing of flags and the
diverse population in Louisiana meant that neither the Spanish nor the Americans could be
ensured of Louisiana loyalty in the event of war. Since the strategic location of Louisiana was
vital to the interests of both sides, winning the support of the locals and organizing them to fight
for their choice was of vital importance. The Americans held three advantages: physical
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possession of the territory, geographic proximity, and a competent leader in the form of William
C. C. Claiborne.
Claiborne’s ultimate success or failure to win over the Louisianans and organize them in
their defense depended upon his ability to organize the citizens of Louisiana into a militia that
would fight for the American flag. In this, Claiborne succeeded by not attempting a rapid
overhaul of the existing system. Instead, he took time to learn about the people he governed and
to bring them gradually into the American military and political system. By supporting the
volunteer companies, he provided himself with a corps of interested citizens with a stake in
American success. Through his efforts to support the participation of free men of color in the
militia, Claiborne avoided a possibly disastrous situation in which hundreds of armed and
disaffected citizens could be induced to turn against the government. As for the general militia,
Claiborne encouraged his subordinates living in rural communities to follow his model in New
Orleans: determine who was competent and keep them; determine who was incompetent and
replace them. By giving his subordinates local authority, as Jefferson did with him, Claiborne
allowed individuals with the best judgment of competence and loyalty to make decisions
regarding organizing the militia in their districts. William C. C. Claiborne’s successful
establishment of the American militia system in the Orleans Territory played a key role in the
retention of the new territory despite the abundance of international and domestic dilemmas the
United States government faced.
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